Changes in the size distribution of U.S. banks: 1960-2005 by Hubert P. Janicki & Edward S. Prescott
Changes in the Size
Distribution of U.S. Banks:
1960–2005
Hubert P. Janicki and Edward Simpson Prescott
I
n1960,therewerenearly13,000independentbanks. By2005,thenumber
had dropped in half, to about 6,500. In 1960, the ten largest banks held
21 percent of the banking industry’s assets. By 2005, this share had
grown to almost 60 percent. A great deal of these changes started during the
deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s. (Figures 1 and 2 report the time paths
for these two measures.)
By any measure, these numbers represent a dramatic change in the bank
size distribution over the 1960–2005 period. This article documents the
extent of this change. It also documents the change in bank size dynamics,
that is, the entry and exit of banks and the movement of banks through the
size distribution. During this period, new banks formed, many more exited,
either because of failure or merger, and many others changed in their size.
For example, of the ten largest banks in 1960, only three were still among the
top ten largest in 2005.1
Wedocumentthesefactsbecausetheyareanimportantstepindeveloping
a theory of bank size distribution. Although we do not provide one, such
a theory would be valuable because it could be used to answer important
questions such as: How costly were the pre-1980 limits on bank size? How
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Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System. The authors would like to thank
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1 The ten largest banks in 1960 were Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank, First National
City Bank of New York, Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany, Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Company, Bank of California, Security First National Bank,
Banker’s Trust Company, and First National Bank of Chicago. At the end of 2005, only three of
these banks still existed: Bank of America, Citigroup (formerly National City Bank of New York),
and JP Morgan Chase (an amalgamation of many of the banks listed above).
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Figure 1 Total Number of Independent Banks
























Notes: All banks and bank holding companies that are under a higher level holding com-
pany are treated as a single independent bank. Section 3 gives a more precise deﬁnition
of an independent bank.
will the bank size distribution continue to evolve? And will there be more
concentration? If so, should policy do anything about it?
Our analysis of the size distribution emphasizes ﬁtting the data to the
lognormal and Pareto distributions. These distributions are utilized because
they are commonly used to describe skewed distributions and frequently have
been used to describe ﬁrm size distribution. As we will demonstrate, the
lognormal poorly ﬁts the upper right tail of the size distribution. The Pareto
distribution ﬁts better with this part of the distribution, but the quality of the
ﬁt is much better before deregulation.
We examine bank size dynamics along several dimensions. First, we
determine whether the data satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, that is, whether growth
is independent of ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that Gibrat’s Law is a good descrip-
tion of the data during the 1960s and 1970s, before deregulation, but not a
good description afterward. After the 1970s, large banks grew faster than
small banks, though more so in the 1980s and 1990s than they did during theH. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 293
Figure 2 Market Shares of Ten Largest Banks


































Notes: The deﬁnition of a bank is given in Section 3. Data on number of employees
starts in 1969.
2000–2005 period. Second, we document that entry into banking was re-
markably stable over the entire period. Entry is cyclical but averages about
1.5 percent of total operating banks. Finally, we calculate transition matrices,
that is, the probability a bank will move from one size category to another,
over each of the decades. Following Adelman (1958) and Simon and Bonini
(1958),weusethesetransitionprobabilitiesandtheentrydatafrom2000–2005
to forecast continued changes in the size distribution. The forecast predicts
a continued decline in the total number of banks, but at a much slower rate
than in the 1980s and 1990s, followed by a leveling off in the decline. It also
predicts that there will still be a large number of small banks as well as a siz-
able number of mid-size banks. If the present trends continue, the transition
in banking that began in the 1980s is slowing down and coming to an end.
1. LITERATURE
In many industries, the distribution of ﬁrm size is highly skewed to the right,
that is, there are many small ﬁrms and a few large ones. One distribution that
has this characteristic and is frequently used to describe ﬁrm size distribution294 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
is the lognormal distribution. A random variable is lognormally distributed if
the logarithm of the random variable is normally distributed.2
Early studies of ﬁrm size distribution, namely Gibrat (1931), found that
the lognormal distribution ﬁt the empirical data fairly well. Gibrat (1931)
also found evidence that ﬁrm growth was independent of ﬁrm size. This
latter ﬁnding, often called Gibrat’s Law or the Law of Proportionate Effect,
was important because a statistical process that satisﬁes it would generate a
lognormal distribution in the long run.
Later studies have found mixed support for Gibrat’s ﬁndings. In particu-
lar, studies in the 1980s found that the proportional rate of growth of a ﬁrm
conditional on survival decreases in size. Sutton (1997) is a good survey of
these results.
Another category of distributions used to ﬁt the size distribution is based
on the power law. This category takes the form
f(x)= cx−α,
where x>0 and c>0. In economics, the Pareto distribution is a power law
distribution often used to describe highly skewed data.3 It is similar to the
lognormal, but with a thicker right tail.
Powerlawdistributionshavebeenusedinthesciencestoﬁtdatainawide
variety of applications. Newman (2005) surveys various applications of the
power law, including studies of word frequency, magnitude of earthquakes,
diameter of moon craters, intensity of solar ﬂares, and population of cities.
One property observed in many applications is that the size of the r-th largest
observation is inversely proportional to its rank.4 It is observed so frequently
thatitiscalledZipf’sLaw. Likethelognormaldistribution, Zipf’sLawcanbe
generated with appealing assumptions on the dynamics. For example, Simon
and Bonini (1958) study entry dynamics by assuming a constant probability
of entry and show that the distribution follows a power law in the upper tail.
See Gabaix (1999) for a detailed study of Zipf’s Law.









where x>0, μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the natural log of x.
3 The probability density function of a Pareto distribution is
f(x)= kxk
minx−(k+1)
where x>x min, xmin > 0 and k>0. The Pareto distribution is usually expressed as the
probability that random variable X is greater than x, that is, Prob(X≥ x) = xk
minx−k, which is
also a power law.
4 Formally, xr = cr−α, where observation xr has rank r, c is a constant, and α is close to
1. We solve for r, normalize the equation by dividing by N (where the Nth ranked observation
is xmin) and simplify to obtain the counter cumulative function: r/N = 1 − F(x)= (xmin/x)1/α.
This is the Pareto distribution with coefﬁcient k = 1/α.H. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 295
Whether Zipf’s Law ﬁts U.S. ﬁrm size data is a matter of some debate.
Using 1997 U.S. census data, Axtell (2001) ﬁnds that it ﬁts the ﬁrm size
distribution. Using a different data set, however, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright
(2006)ﬁndthatitdoesnotﬁtsowell. Theyalsoﬁndthatestablishmentgrowth
and exit rates decline with size.
The banking literature has long been interested in the size distribution of
banks,partlybecauseofthelargedegreetowhichlawsandregulationslimited
bank size. Recent studies include Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), Ennis
(2001), and Jones and Critchﬁeld (2005).
While the banking literature has long noted that bank size distribution is
skewed, it has not typically tried to ﬁt this using the previously mentioned
category of distributions. This absence has made it difﬁcult to compare bank
size distribution with that of other industries.
There is part of this literature, however, that tests for Gibrat’s Law in
the banking industry but for smaller samples than those used in this study.
Alhadeff andAlhadeff (1964) analyze growth in assets of the 200 largest U.S.
banks between 1930–1960 and ﬁnd the largest banks grew more slowly than
thebankingsystemitself. Theyﬁnd, however, thatthetopbanksthatsurvived
throughout the sample period grew faster than the system as a whole and
attribute this to mergers among the largest banks. Rhoades andYeats (1974)
analyzegrowthamongU.S.banksbydepositsfor1960–1971andﬁndthatthe
largest banks grew more slowly than the whole banking system. In a study
of the 100 largest international banks from 1969 to 1977 by assets, Tschoegl
(1983)ﬁndsthatgrowthratesofbanksareroughlyindependentofsize,butthat
growth rates exhibit positive serial correlation. Saunders and Walter (1994)
use international data for the 200 largest banks for the 1982–1987 period and
rejectGibrat’sLaw,ﬁndingthatthesmallerbanksgrowfasterthanlargerbanks
intermsofassets. Morerecently, Goddard, McKillop, andWilson(2002)ﬁnd
evidence that during the 1990s in the United States, large credit unions grew
faster than their smaller counterparts.
As we discussed, the ﬁrm growth results are important because they ul-
timately determine the distribution of ﬁrm sizes. One interesting strand in
the literature calculates a Markov transition matrix of movement between size
categories and then calculates stationary size distributions. Early examples
include Hart and Prais (1956), Simon and Bonini (1958), and the study of the
steel industry by Adelman (1958). The only study that we are aware of that
applies this technique to banking is Robertson (2001).
More recently, the literature has attempted to generate ﬁrm size dynam-
ics, and ultimately a size distribution, from models of maximizing behavior
of ﬁrms. Sutton (1997) surveys several such models. One paper in this liter-
ature is the learning model of Jovanovic (1982), in which new ﬁrms receive
productivity shocks, learn about them over time, and then decide whether to
continue or exit. Another prominent example is Hopenhayn (1992).296 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. LEGALAND REGULATORY LIMITS ON BANK SIZE
Describingbanksizedistributionisparticularlyimportantbecauseofthemany
legal and regulatory limits on bank size that existed through the 1970s and
were removed during the 1980s and 1990s. As we will see, the removal of
these barriers coincide with dramatic changes in size dynamics and the size
distribution.
In 1960, banks could not branch across state lines and some states even
forbade branching within a state.5 The 1966 DouglasAmendment to the 1956
Bank Holding Company Act allowed interstate banking only with expressed
authorization by participating states. However, no state allowed interstate
banking at the time and the amendment was not even exercised until 1978
when Maine allowed out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to operate
within the state.6 Over the next 12 years, many of the intrastate and interstate
restrictions were removed by the states.7
The remaining interstate banking restrictions were removed by the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act of 1994. The
act permitted bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state and, be-
ginning in 1997, allowed interstate bank mergers. (See Kane [1996] for a
summary of the act.) More recently, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
allowed banks to engage in nonbanking ﬁnancial activities such as insurance.
3. THE DATA
Manybanksoperateunderabankholdingcompanystructure. Abankholding
company is a legal entity that i)directly or indirectly owns at least 25 percent
ofthebank’sstock, ii)controlstheelectionofamajorityofabank’sdirectors,
or iii)is deemed to exert controlling inﬂuence of bank policy by the Federal
Reserve (Spong 2000). Many bank holding companies have multiple banks
and even other holding companies under their control. Historically, this legal
organization was used to avoid some of the restrictions on branching (Mengle
1990). In many cases, a bank holding company would operate many activi-
ties jointly. For this reason, we follow Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995)
and treat all banks and bank holding companies under a higher level holding
5 The 1927 McFadden Act forbade interstate branching by federally chartered banks. Later,
the Federal Reserve extended the ruling to include all state-chartered banks that are regulated by
the Federal Reserve.
6 There were some means around these restrictions. For example, the 1956 Bank Holding
Company Act did not limit the location of nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, so
some banks had a cross-state network of nonbranch ofﬁces that would specialize in activities like
lending. Also, some exemptions were allowed for the acquisition of insolvent banks from govern-
ment deposit insurance funds (Kane 1996).
7 Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) list when states removed restrictions to interstate banking and
intrastate branching.H. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 297
company as a single independent banking enterprise. For convenience, we
will typically refer to each of these entities as a bank.
Data on banks are taken from the Reports on Condition and Income (the
“Call Report”) collected by federal bank regulators. We use fourth quarter
data on all commercial banks in the United States. We look speciﬁcally at
commercial banks and exclude savings banks, savings and loan associations,
credit unions, investment banks, mutual funds, and credit card banks. Indi-
vidual commercial banks that belong to a holding company are then grouped
according to a unique bank holding company regulatory number, and their
assets, deposits, loans, and employees are summed and replaced by one entry
in our data set. Our data set, therefore, tracks bank holding companies and
independent commercial banks not afﬁliated with a holding company. It does
not distinguish between a merger and a failure. Both events are treated as an
exit.
We use four measures of bank size. The ﬁrst is commercial bank assets.
For this variable, we have data from 1960–2005. Prior to 1969, we only have
domestic holdings, but after 1969, we have foreign and domestic holdings.
The next two size measures are domestic holdings of deposits and loans. For
both of these variables, we have data from 1960–2005. The ﬁnal size measure
is the number of domestic employees.8 For this last measure, we only have
datafor1969–2005. Assetsandloansareadjustedtoincludeoff-balance-sheet
items starting in 1990. (See the Appendix for details.) All the variables are
adjusted for the total aggregate size of that variable in each year. In particular,
ﬁrm size data are converted into market share numbers for that year and then
multiplied by the total quantity in the banking industry of that variable in
2004. The market share adjustment facilitates comparison across years, while
the scaling by 2004 aggregate quantities gives a sense of the size in terms of
recent quantities.
4. THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION
Thesizedistributionofbankshasalwaysbeenskewed,butithasbecomemore
so since the 1960s. Figure 3 shows the distribution of assets for 1960, 1980,
and 2005. Each year is normalized by the total assets in that year relative
to 2004 so that the distributions are comparable over time. The distribution
is plotted on a log scale. Because the size distribution is so skewed to the
right, the log scale—or something similar—is needed to ﬁt all the banks on
the graph.
Figure 3 demonstrates that there are a large number of small banks and
a few large banks. As is evident, there is a shift in the distribution to the left
8 The Call Report counts employees in terms of full-time equivalents.298 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly






























Assets (Millions USD, 2004) Log Scale
Notes: Each line is a probability distribution of bank size as measured by assets for a
given year.
over time. Since we have scaled assets in each year to be the same scale, this
change means that a higher fraction of the assets are being held by the small
number of large banks, as indicated earlier in Figure 2.
Visually, the graphs suggest that the distribution might be accurately rep-
resented by a lognormal distribution. Figure 4 reports the actual distribution
and an estimated lognormal distribution for assets in 2005, where the log-
normal has parameters μ and σ2 obtained from the 2005 data set. However,
the distribution fails the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness-of-ﬁt. This
is true for almost all the years in the data set, as well as for the other size
measures.
Theestimatedlognormaldistributiondoesaparticularlypoorjobofﬁtting
the right tail of the distribution. This is hard to see in Figure 4 because of the
small number of large banks. The ﬁt at the right tail is better seen if we use
a rank-frequency, or Zipf plot. For a power law distribution plotted on a log
scale, this type of graph has the valuable property that the slope will be linear.
For example, let xr = cr−α, where r is the rank of a variable. Taking theH. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 299
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Notes: The parameters μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the
natural log of assets. The lognormal distribution is calculated using these parameters.
logarithm of both sides, we obtain the equation,
ln(xr) = ln(c) − αln(r).
If α = 1, then Zipf’s Law holds.
Figure 5 is a Zipf plot for the bank size distribution in 2005.9 It plots the
data and the lognormal distribution using the sample mean and variance.
Figure 5 demonstrates that the lognormal distribution underestimates the
density of the right tail (which is the left side in the Zipf plot). Indeed,
if the plot is linear, we know that the right tail of the distribution of bank
holding companies can be better approximated by the Pareto distribution.




9 Zipf plots for different size measures look very similar.300 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly

































































Notes: The parameters μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of
the natural log of assets. The lognormal distribution is calculated using these parameters.
The estimate for the Pareto distribution is only for the 3,000 largest banks.
We can formally test whether the right tail of the distribution satisﬁes
Zipf’s Law. One common method is to estimate the slope by ﬁtting a linear
regression of the form,
ln(xi) = α0 + α1ln(ri) +  i, (1)
where r is the rank of the bank. The coefﬁcient α1 is a power exponent in the
Pareto distribution and if it is equal to –1, then Zipf’s Law holds.
Ordinary least squares estimates of (1) will underestimate α1 (see Gabaix
and Ioannides 2004). For this reason, we use the maximum likelihood es-
timator in Newman (2005) to estimate the power coefﬁcient in the Pareto
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Table 1 Zipf’s Law: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
1960 1970 1980 1990 2005
–α1 SE –α1 SE –α1 SE –α1 SE –α1 SE
Assets 1.001 0.001 1.030 0.001 1.018 0.001 1.017 0.001 1.136 0.001
Deposits 0.998 0.001 1.016 0.001 0.983 0.001 0.982 0.001 1.092 0.001
Loans 1.028 0.001 1.051 0.001 1.007 0.001 1.082 0.001 1.187 0.001
Employees – – 1.022 0.065 1.031 0.073 1.005 0.084 1.052 0.096
Notes: The estimates are reported as −α1.
The maximum likelihood estimates for several different years are reported in
Table 1.10 We restrict the estimates to the tail by limiting the sample to the
largest3,000banksforeachyear. Althoughtheyarenotidenticalacrossyears,
they broadly support Zipf’s Law in the upper tail, but the results are sensitive
to the cutoff.
TheworstﬁtinTable1isin2005. ThiscanbeseeninFigure5. Thestraight
line in Figure 5 graphs the power distribution for the maximum likelihood
estimate based on the 3,000 largest banks. The distribution is a straight line
with slope –1.136. The slope is too high for Zipf’s Law. Furthermore, the
slope is high because the larger banks are larger than predicted by Zipf’s Law,
though this is less true for the largest.
Incontrast, theﬁtforassetsin1960isexcellent. Figure6isaZipfplotfor
assetsin1960. Thedistributionisastraightlinewithslope–0.999, practically
the same as in Zipf’s Law.
Theestimatesforassetsin1970, 1980, and1990aresimilar, butthishides
an important difference. The year 1970 is similar to 1960 in that many of the
largest banks are smaller in size than predicted by the estimate. In 1980, this
pattern changes to one where the largest banks are larger than predicted. The
differences in the predictions for the largest banks are even larger in 1990 and
look similar to that of 2005 (see Figure 5).
To summarize, only the right tail can reasonably be considered to be ﬁtted
byZipf’sLaw,andtheﬁtdependsontheyear. Itdoeswellin1960,butstarting
in 1980 Zipf’s Law predicts that the largest banks will be smaller than in the
data. The lognormal distribution poorly ﬁts the size of the largest banks but
better ﬁts the small banks.
10 We calculate standard errors using the method outlined in Gabaix and Ioannides (2004).302 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly


































































Notes: The parameters μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of
the natural log of assets. The lognormal distribution is calculated using these parameters.
The estimate for the Pareto distribution is only for the 3,000 largest banks.
5. DOES GIBRAT’S LAW HOLD FOR BANKS?
Gibrat’s Law states that ﬁrm size growth is independent of ﬁrm size. For our
ﬁrst test of this law, we ﬁt the following linear equation,
ln(xit+1) = β0 + β1ln(xit) +  it, (2)
where xit is the size measure (assets, employees, etc.) of bank i at time t.A
coefﬁcient value of β1 = 1 means that growth is independent of size.
We estimated (2) over each decade and over 2000–2005 using ordinary
least squares. We only considered banks in the sample that were around at the
beginning and end of the estimation period. Those that exited were dropped
from the sample.11 The estimates are reported in Table 2.
11 Sometimes the literature includes exiting banks and sometimes it does not. See Sutton
(1997) for more information. To reduce survivorship bias, we also estimated equation (2) over
each year and found similar results to those reported in Table 2.H. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 303
Table 2 Gibrat’s Law: Estimates
1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2005
Assets
β0 0.143 (0.031) 0.574 (0.034) 0.043 (0.057) –0.187 (0.074) 0.015 (0.061)
β1 0.987 (0.003) 0.953 (0.003) 1.011 (0.005) 1.024 (0.006) 0.998 (0.005)
R2 0.929 0.915 0.847 0.823 0.869
Deposits
β0 0.435 (0.030) 1.004 (0.033) 0.131 (0.058) 0.654 (0.075) 0.379 (0.063)
β1 0.971 (0.003) 0.929 (0.003) 0.999 (0.005) 0.972 (0.007) 0.970 (0.005)
R2 0.923 0.902 0.826 0.787 0.847
Loans
β0 0.545 (0.037) 1.368 (0.039) 0.000 (0.071) 0.635 (0.074) 0.444 (0.069)
β1 0.960 (0.003) 0.901 (0.003) 0.993 (0.006) 0.964 (0.007) 0.962 (0.006)
R2 0.889 0.870 0.767 0.782 0.812
Employees
β0 – – –0.021 (0.012) 0.240 (0.016) 0.284 (0.022) 0.101 (0.017)
β1 –– 1.006 (0.003) 1.001 (0.004) 1.008 (0.006) 0.994 (0.004)
R2 – 0.897 0.862 0.829 0.900
Notes: The table provides ordinary least squares estimates of equation (2) for each sample
period. Standard errors are in parentheses. Numbers in bold are the slope estimates of
the effect of ﬁrm size on growth. An estimate close to one is consistent with Gibrat’s
Law.
The estimates inTable 2 are close to one for all the decades and variables.
While broadly supportive of Gibrat’s Law, these estimates put a great deal of
emphasis on small banks because they comprise most of the sample. For this
reason, we broke the sample into different size categories and then calculated
the annualized growth rates over the same periods for banks in each category.
Asbefore,weonlyconsideredbanksthatsurvived. Figure7reportsthegrowth
rates for assets, deposits, and loans.12
Just as in Table 2, growth measures do not vary much with size in the
1960s and 1970s.13 In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the numbers in Figure
7 present a different picture than the estimates in Table 2. As demonstrated
by the ﬁgure, the largest banks clearly grew faster than the small banks. This
is also true for the 2000–2005 period, but the effect is less pronounced.
12A ﬁgure showing employee growth rates is excluded because the growth rates jump around
signiﬁcantly and do not show any clear patterns.
13 We have also calculated annual growth rates over each period and then averaged them to
get a similar ﬁgure. (Over the 1960–1969 period, for example, this meant calculating the 1960–
1961, 1961–1962, etc., growth rates and then averaging them.) The results are similar.304 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Notes: The size measure is broken into seven size categories and then average annualized
growth rates are reported for each category.H. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 305
Gibrat’s model that yields the law of proportionate effect assumes that
growth rates are not persistent over time. To check the validity of this as-
sumption, we calculate the correlation of growth rates for surviving banks in
each decade. We ﬁnd that correlations of growth rates for all variables are
very low. In the 1960s, it is 0.0610; in the 1970s, it is 0.0331; in the 1980s, it
is 0.0691; in the 1990s, it is 0.0722; and after 2000, it is 0.1617. Correlation
coefﬁcients of growth in the remaining variables are of similar magnitude.
To conclude, growth rates appear to be independent of size in the 1960s
and 1970s, but they are positively related to size in the 1980s and 1990s. In
the 2000–2005 period, the growth rates are also higher for the largest banks,
but less so than in the previous two decades. It appears that the 1960s and
1970s were relatively stationary periods, but the 1980s and 1990s were a
long transition period, no doubt due to the legal, regulatory, and technological
changes of the period. Finally, the 2000–2005 period appears to be the end of
thetransition, asthesizedynamicsseemtobereturningslowlytothenumbers
of the 1960s and 1970s. Of course, this conclusion is tentative because trends
calculated from ﬁve years of data can easily be transitory.
6. ENTRYAND EXIT
Despite the large number of banks that have exited the industry over the last
45 years, there has been a consistent ﬂow of new bank entries. The number
of entries and exits (including mergers) expressed as a fraction of the banking
population is reported in Figure 8.
Visually, it is apparent that the ﬂow of new banks is a relatively constant
fraction of the banking population. To check this, we estimated a linear time
trend of the number of entries as a fraction of the number of banks operating.
Speciﬁcally we estimated the equation,
yt = γ 0 + γ 1t +  t,
whereyt isthefractionofentriesperyearandt isthetimetrend. Theordinary
leastsquaresestimatesareγ 0 = 0.0145(0.0018),γ 1 = 0.0001(0.0001)with
R2=0.0612. Standard errors are in parentheses. There is no time trend in the
ﬂow of new banks, though there is a signiﬁcant amount of cyclical variation.
The fraction of banks that exit varied a great deal over time. There was
a signiﬁcant increase starting in the 1980s and, except for a short dip in the
early 1990s, the high level continued through the late 1990s. No doubt much
of this exit was due to mergers, particularly those that occurred in the 1990s,
but our data does not allow us to distinguish between these two sources of
exit. It is only in the last ﬁve years that the rate of exit seems to slow down.
It is striking that despite the huge number of bank exits starting in the
1980s, entry remained strong throughout the entire period. Interestingly, it
is virtually uncorrelated with exit. For example, the correlation between exit306 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Fraction of Banks that Enter and Exit byYear











































Notes: The chart reports the gross ﬂow of banks that enter and exit expressed as a
fraction of banks in each year.
and entry for the 1985–2005 period is only –0.07. This evidence means that a
theory of the bank size distribution needs to be able to generate robust entry,
even when the total number of banks is declining.
7. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we use the information previously documented—the size dis-
tribution at a point of time, entry and exit rates, and bank dynamics—to make
forecasts of what will happen to the size distribution. We also perform coun-
terfactual experiments such as what would have happened to the bank size
distribution if the dynamics had not changed. The purpose of these exercises
is to develop a sense of how changes in size dynamics have mattered for the
size distribution.
To make these calculations, we do not use growth rates at the individual
banklevel. Instead,wedosomethingsimilarbyconstructingasimpleMarkov
chain model following Adelman (1958). A Markov chain model splits theH. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 307
Figure 9 Projected Number of Banks

































Notes: Each projection is made by taking the transition matrix estimated over a given
period and then calculating the total number of banks that would operate after the last




that starts in size category i will move into size category j in the next period.
A Markov model allows for straightforward predictions about changes to
a size distribution. For example, if the size distribution at time t is st, then the
size distribution at time t + n is
st+n = P nst.
If a Markov model has the property that a bank starting in any category
has a positive probability of moving to any other size category in a ﬁnite
number of periods, then several useful theorems apply. First, there exists a308 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly









Notes: A list of size categories used in the Markov model. In all years, data are converted
into market share numbers and then multiplied by the total quantity of assets in 2004.
stationary distribution, that is, there exists s such that s = Ps.14 Second,
the stationary distribution is unique and independent of the initial distribution
of banks. Therefore, regardless of the initial distribution, if the transition
matrix, P, is repeatedly applied to the distribution, then the size distribution
will approach the unique stationary distribution.
We construct seven different size categories. These are listed in Table 3.
All the data are scaled as we discussed earlier to make it possible to compare
acrossyears. Wealsoincludeaneighthcategorythatrepresentsbanksthatare
inactive. New banks come from this category and exiting banks move into it.
We calculate the number of banks in each of the seven active categories. For
the inactive banks, we assume that there is a large pool of 100,000 potential
entries.
Our transition matrix is calculated by counting the fraction of banks that
move from size category i to j each year over the speciﬁed time period. Entry
rates are calculated so that a constant fraction of potential banks enter.
Forourﬁrstexercise,weusethetransitionmatricesestimatedoverseveral
ranges of time periods to forecast the aggregate number of banks in the in-
dustry. We estimate several transition matrices and make predictions to 2013.
The results are illustrated in Figure 9. For each period, we calculate the tran-
sition matrix and then forecast the change in the total number of banks as if
the transition probabilities had not changed from that time period forward.
This exercise is similar to one in Jones and Critchﬁeld (2005), although our
methodology is very different. An advantage of our Markov chain model is
that we have information on the entire distribution at each point in Figure 9.
As is clear from the earlier analysis, as well as from Figure 9, the size
dynamics changed signiﬁcantly over this period. Nevertheless, the exercise
14 Let sj be the fraction of banks in size category j. The stationary distribution s is the
solution to the set of equations s = Ps and

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Table 4 Stationary Distribution of Banks byAssets
Size 1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2005
Categories 1969 SS 1979 SS 1989 SS 1999 SS 2005 SS
1 0.333 0.357 0.379 0.439 0.379 0.471 0.440 0.523 0.480 0.540
2 0.504 0.516 0.492 0.485 0.488 0.435 0.436 0.377 0.399 0.363
3 0.085 0.076 0.064 0.044 0.067 0.049 0.061 0.051 0.060 0.050
4 0.060 0.042 0.046 0.021 0.043 0.027 0.044 0.037 0.043 0.033
5 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.006
6 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005
7 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.003
Notes: Columns under a year list the actual size distribution in that year. Columns under
“SS” list the stationary distribution as calculated from the estimated transition probabilities
for that period.
is interesting because it illustrates how the dynamics matter for the size dis-
tribution. For example, the 1960s and 1970s look relatively stable. If these
dynamicshadnotchanged,therewouldnothavebeenmuchchangeinthetotal
number of banks. In the 1980s and 1990s, the dynamics predicted continued
substantial declines in the number of banks. However, the transition proba-
bilities changed signiﬁcantly in the 2000–2005 period and as a consequence,
the decline in the number of banks leveled off.
Table 4 reports stationary size distributions calculated from the estimated
transition matrices for several periods in the data. We compare them with
the actual distribution at the end of each period in order to illustrate whether
the existing distribution was close to the stationary distribution. Interestingly,
for every period, we ﬁnd that the fraction of banks that are in the smallest
category is higher in the stationary distribution than in the ﬁnal year of the
period. We also ﬁnd that for every other period, the fraction of banks in each
oftheothersizecategoriesislessinthestationarydistributionthanintheﬁnal
year (the only exceptions are during Category 2 [1960–1969] and Category 7
[1970–1979] and [1980–1989]).
Table4hasseveralimplications. First,evenintherelativelystabledecades
of the 1960s and 1970s, the size distribution was not at a stationary point
and under the estimated transition probabilities, the distribution would have
continuedtochange. Second, therewillcontinuetobelargenumbersofsmall
banks,evenifthefractionofassetstheyholdisnotlarge. Third,wecanseethat
the dynamics for the 1990s imply even more concentration than the dynamics
from the 1980s. This was also suggested by Figure 9. Finally, there will
continuetobealargenumberofmid-sizebanks. Themostrecentmergerwave
ledsomecommentatorstospeculatethatthebanksizedistributionwouldtakea
“barbell”shapewithonlysmallbanksandlargebanks. Thesmallbankswould310 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 5 Distribution of BankAssets
2005 Stationary
Size Fraction Fraction Fraction Fraction
Categories of Banks of Assets of Banks of Assets
1 0.480 0.014 0.540 0.022
2 0.399 0.050 0.363 0.062
3 0.060 0.024 0.050 0.027
4 0.043 0.047 0.033 0.050
5 0.008 0.034 0.006 0.035
6 0.006 0.068 0.005 0.083
7 0.005 0.763 0.003 0.721
Notes: Fraction of assets for the stationary distribution was calculated by assuming that
the mean assets in each size category are the same as in 2005.
survive because of their comparative advantage at small business lending and
the big banks would take advantage of their scale economies. Based on the
stationary distribution calculated from the 2000–2005 transition probabilities,
there will continue to be more mid-size banks than large banks. Indeed, the
2000–2005 stationary distribution has a higher fraction of Category 5 banks
than the stationary distributions of the 1960s and 1970s.
Table 5 reports the fraction of assets held by each size category in 2005
and in the stationary distribution based on the 2000–2005 data. Interestingly,
in the stationary distribution, only the largest size category holds a smaller
percentageofassetsthanitdoesin2005. Thisstrikingﬁndingdemonstratesthe
importanceofthetransitionprobabilitiesfordeterminingthesizedistribution.
Finally, we report in Table 6 the estimated transition matrix for the 2000–
2005 period. The ﬁrst row lists the probability of a new bank forming and
starting in each size category. The ﬁrst column lists the probability a bank
of each size category exits (and for an inactive bank, stays inactive). For the
giventimeperiod, allenteringbanksenterintothesmallestsizecategory. The
ﬁrstcolumnshowstheprobabilityofexit, eitherbyfailureormerger, fromthe
industry. Exit is most common in the largest category and represents mergers.
We see that banks in any size category are most likely to remain in the same
bin as denoted by the diagonal entries. Finally, the matrix shows that banks
gradually change in size. Except for exits, banks almost always stay within
one size category of the previous year.
8. CONCLUSION
Inthispaper,wedocumentedthelargechangesinthesizedistributionofbanks
that occurred starting in the 1980s. We found that the lognormal distribution
poorly ﬁts the right tail of the size distribution. Zipf’s Law ﬁts better, but forH. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 311
some size measures in some periods, this distribution does not ﬁt the largest
banks that well.
Wealsodocumentedsomedifferencesandsimilaritiesinthesizedynamics
over time. First, we found that new banks are a constant fraction of the
total number of banks. Second, we also found that Gibrat’s Law is a good
approximation for the 1960s and 1970s, before deregulation, but does not
describe the 1980s and 1990s. In these decades, the large banks grow the
fastest. The last ﬁve years of data suggest that the dynamics are returning to
the earlier, more stable period. Of course, ﬁve years of data are not enough to
make a strong prediction.
Wealsoperformedasimpleforecastingexercise,usingthetransitionprob-
abilities taken from different time periods. Again, the relative constancy of
the number of banks in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that this period was
relatively stable. The projected rapid decline in the number of banks using
1980s and 1990s transition probabilities is evidence of the rapid changes that
occurred in the banking industry during that time. Finally, the 2000–2005
transition probabilities predict a leveling off in the number of banks.15 If that
trendcontinues, thenwewillbereturningtoarelativelystableperiodinbank-
ing, at least as measured by the number of banks. The size dynamics imply
that the U.S. banking structure will continue to have large numbers of small
banks and a decent number of mid-size banks.
Asillustratedbythetransitionprobabilityanalysis,thesizedistributionde-
pends, ultimately, on the size dynamics. Therefore, a theory of the changes in
bank size distribution needs an explanation of why the size dynamics changed
and by how much. The data demonstrate that these changes started in the
1980s as deregulation proceeded, so the natural place to start is with an under-
standing of how removals to growth and size limits change the growth rates of
different size banks. A successful theory would also need to account for the
robust entry over this period, despite the large number of banks that exited.
15 Jones and Critchﬁeld (2005) make a similar prediction, using a different forecasting method.312 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 6 Transition Probability Matrix for BankAssets: 2000–2005
Size Categories Inactive 1 2 34567
Inactive 0.999 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.024 0.927 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.030 0.043 0.908 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.040 0.000 0.076 0.827 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.050 0.000 0.003 0.048 0.879 0.020 0.001 0.000
5 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.827 0.086 0.000
6 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.849 0.030
7 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.920
Notes: This matrix has the property that a bank starting in any size category will reach
with positive probability any other size category in a ﬁnite number of periods. Probabil-
ities that are signiﬁcantly different than zero are highlighted in bold.
APPENDIX: OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS
Banks can make commitments that are not directly measured by a traditional
balance sheet. For example, a loan commitment is a promise to make a loan
undercertainconditions. Traditionally,thiskindofpromisewasnotmeasured
as an asset on a balance sheet. As documented by Boyd and Gertler (1994),
providing this and other off-balance-sheet items have become an important
serviceprovidedbybanks,whichmeansthattraditionalbalancesheetnumbers
did not accurately report some of the implicit assets and liabilities of a bank.
We account for loan commitment and other off-balance-sheet items such
as derivatives by converting them into credit equivalents and then adding
them to on-balance-sheet assets and loans. This method is similar to the
“Basel Credit Equivalents” series found in Boyd and Gertler (1994). Off-
balance-sheet items are weighted by a credit conversion factor to create credit
equivalents. We make these adjustments starting in 1989 because it is only
from this year that we have the complete data to make them. Both panels of
Figure 10 demonstrate the importance of the adjustment by plotting aggregate
assets and loans with and without the adjustment, as well as by plotting credit
equivalents as a share of total loans. A detailed list of off-balance-sheet items
and credit equivalent weights is found in Table 7. These weights are used
by federal regulators to determine credit equivalents for regulatory capital
purposes.H. P. Janicki and E. S. Prescott: Bank Size Distribution 313
Figure10 Total Credit Equivalents inAssets and Loans
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Notes: Top panel reports assets and loans both unadjusted and adjusted for off-balance-
sheet items. Bottom panel reports the fraction of adjusted loans that are due to the credit
equivalent adjustment. Credit equivalents are based on the weights used by regulators to
determine regulatory capital requirements.314 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 7 Off-Balance-Sheet Items and Credit Equivalents
Item Conversion Factor
Financial Standby Letters of Credit 1.00
Performance and Standby Letters of Credit 0.50
Commercial Standby Letters of Credit 0.20
Risk Participations in Bankers’ Acceptances 1.00
Securities Lent 1.00
Retained Recourse on Small Business Obligations 1.00
Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes 1.00
Other Financial Assets Sold with Recourse 1.00
Other Off-Balance-Sheet Liabilities 1.00
Unused Loan Commitments (maturity >1 year) 0.50
Derivatives –
Notes: Conversion factors used by regulators for determining credit equivalents of
off-balance-sheet items. The source is FFIEC 041 Schedule RC-R retrieved from:
www.fﬁec.gov/forms041.htm (accessed on November 10, 2005).
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